防空群对多批次小间隔目标射击效能评估

基于排队网络理论的适用性分析以及基本假设与适当简化,将防空群对多批次、小间隔目标射击问题转化、抽象为排队网络对顾客流的服务问题,建立了防空群对多批次、小间隔目标射击效能评估的"分布式协同排队网络"模型。在特定作战实例和假设条件下,应用所建模型,计算得出了典型火力配属方案下防空群对多批次、小间隔目标射击效能的量化结果,实现了防空群对多批次、小间隔目标的射击效能的定量化评估,验证了所建模型的可行性与有效性。     

战区防空雷达组网系统体系结构及通信链路研究

针对优化现役战区防空雷达系统的部署结构,提高其战时稳定性、提升其整体作战效能的问题,提出了一种“雷达组网系统”实用研发对策,并对其具体的系统体系结构、雷达群站系统构成、信息链路等问题进行了探讨和研究。     

Does aid cause conflict in Pakistan?

This study provides evidence from Pakistan on how the delegated task of achieving strategic objectives of the donor can lead to incompatibility of aid objectives which then generates perpetual and multidimensional domestic conflict in the recipient society. We use count data method to estimate the relationship between aid and conflict. At the aggregate level, social sector spending, regime change and youth bulge are positively and significantly related with conflict. However, aid per capita gives ambiguous results. It is significant with conflict count in the terrorism data-set and insignificant for data on armed conflict. Inclusion of youth bulge and unemployment rate confirms the marginalization hypothesis of conflict. Inflation rate and the tax variables are insignificant. This confirms that aid erodes fiscal capacity. At project-level data, conflict is strongly related with aid commitment and purpose. Discrepancy in aid allocation and commitment may accentuate conflict.     

“Effing” the military: a political misunderstanding of management

The use of commercial business management techniques is widespread in all government departments, including the Ministry of Defence. This article examines the use of popular management techniques in the Armed Forces and argues that their application is misplaced. It looks at what the “effs” – “efficiency” and “effectiveness” – mean in the business world and to the Armed Forces. It compares the definitions both in business and the Armed Forces and finds that there are few, if any, situations where the same measurements can be applied. Whilst many management techniques are suited for business, the function of the Armed Forces and its output cannot be measured in the same way, complicated by the different metrics of “efficiency” in peace and in war. This difference may not be clearly understood by some politicians, or indeed by some senior military personnel. Using examples from some of the most popular management techniques such as “Lean” and “Agile” it is possible to see that their use might actually diminish the capabilities of the Armed Forces when it comes to performing their principal role – the use of force to achieve political objectives.     

Country survey: military expenditure and defence policy in Norway 1970–2013

This article examines military expenditure and defence policy in Norway from 1970 to 2013. Until 1990 Norwegian military expenditure remained between 2.5 and 3.0 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Despite constant GDP shares, the military expenditure could not sustain a large and properly armed mobilization army. The constant nominal defence budgets of the 1990s accentuated the Norwegian Armed Forces' underlying imbalance between tasks, structure and budget. Around year 2000, large organizational reforms were effectuated, in which costs, the number of man-years, and underlying imbalances between tasks, structure and budget were reduced. Military expenditure increased in nominal terms between 2003 and 2013, while real military expenditure remained practically constant.     

Military Expenditure,Economic Growth and Heterogeneity

This paper examines the impact of military expenditure on economic growth on a large balanced panel, using an exogenous growth model and dynamic panel data methods for 106 countries over the period 1988–2010. A major focus of the paper is to consider the possibility group heterogeneity and non-linearity. Having estimated the model for all of the countries in the panel and finding that military burden has a negative effect on growth in the short and long run, the panel is broken down into various groupings based upon a range of potentially relevant factors, and the robustness of the results is evaluated. The factors considered are different levels of income, conflict experience, natural resources abundance, openness and aid. The estimates for the different groups are remarkably consistent with those for the whole panel, providing strong support for the argument that military spending has adverse effects on growth. There are, however, some intriguing results that suggest that for certain types of countries military spending has no significant effect on growth.     

Advancing “Defence-in-depth”: intelligence and systems dynamics

This article aims to encourage the fostering of more systems thinking, and its greater exploitation, within the domain of contemporary intelligence. With particular focus on “micro systems thinking” and with reference to key intelligence processes, such as intelligence analysis, the utility of many systems dynamics within the intelligence context seeks to be further revealed. Through their greater collective harnessing, including up to “System of Systems” (“SoS”) dynamics, and promoting all that they can offer, more sophisticated overarching operational-to-strategic/policy “ends,” notably that of “defence-in-depth,” can be viably further advanced in a sustainable manner into the future. Arguably, a much-needed transformative impact on contemporary intelligence can also be increasingly realised through comprehensively engaging in and with more systems and SoS thinking. Aiding civil protection tasks, crisis management, emergency planners, and civil contingency practitioners likewise gain.     

南宋钓鱼城城池防御初探

针对古代战争研究与当今国防建设缺乏关联的问题,首次就钓鱼城保卫战经典战例对我国现代国防建设的启示意义作了研究。分析钓鱼城城池选址"独"与"险"的地理关系、筑城布局内容和多层综合防御体系这三者对战争胜利的关键影响,提出在当前国防工程规划与建设中借鉴其成功经验的观点,并从工程宏观选址、多城池防御的联防体系及军民联合的防御模式等三方面就其经验和启示意义进行归纳与总结。     

FIPA规范的防空导弹体系Agent建模方法

针对防空导弹体系建模的复杂性,探讨研究防空导弹体系的Agent建模方法.提出了基于G/A矩阵的Agent建模方法步骤,通过分析角色之间的关系描述了Agent组织结构,给出了角色类和Agent类的统一定义,并建立了Agent结构框架和类实现模型,最后构建了基于FIPA规范的MAS综合集成框架.该方法的提出,为防空导弹体系的进一步建模提供了方法依据.     

Constraining missile defence†

Assessing missile defence through the prism of offence–defence theory requires primarily an examination of legal and structural constraints on future development. New weapons technology is frequently cited as having the most critical impact on the offence–defence balance. Yet, the method for assessing the introduction of a new weapons technology tends to neglect projected maturity and instead focus excessively on the initial rudimentary capabilities. It is argued here that the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO’s) missile defence is set to incrementally become more advanced in terms of quality, quantity and mobility, which is supported by a strategy that is increasingly favouring offence. As the system gradually enhances the offensive advantage vis-à-vis Russia, NATO categorically rejects any legal or structural constraints on future deployments.